Aumann- Serrano (2008) and Foster-Hart (2009) suggest two new riskiness measures, each of which enables one to elicit a complete and objective ranking of gambles according to their riskiness. These riskiness measures were created with a risky world in mind, but not an uncertain one. We apply similar arguments to models of decision under uncertainty, and develop complete and objective rankings of sets of gambles, which arise naturally in many such models. Clearly, these results extend the previous riskiness measures, and they have a natural interpretation in terms of those measures even when uncertainty does play a signi…cant role.
Introduction
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y Department of Economics and Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University. E-mail : motimich@gmail.com. function to be maximized. This is often addressed by utility-based (or preferencebased) maximization. Models that adopt this approach, like the "maxmin expected utility"model (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989 ; MEU henceforth) or the "smooth ambiguity" model (Klibano¤ et al. 2005) , derive the objective function from a set of axioms on the preferences of a speci…c decision maker, and can rather easily be applied to answer this question with regard to investment choice between uncertain prospects. 1 However, other approaches are possible too, and are particularly warranted when it is complicated or undesired to determine one speci…c utility function to maximize. For example, one can wish to use some kind of "uniformity" over a large set of reasonable utility functions as a way to rank risky or uncertain prospects. In particular, one may look at rejections that are uniform over wealth levels or over the utilities in a chosen set, as Hart (2011) does in the domain of risk, where an objective probability measure is given. We apply the same method to the domain of uncertainty, where a unique and objective probability measure is not given, and develop complete and objective rankings of uncertain prospects in cases where decision under uncertainty can be represented as a choice between sets of gambles. 2 Alternatively, one may use utility-independent criteria, such as avoiding bankruptcy, or guaranteeing a certain minimal gain, or maximal loss, and so on. Foster and Hart (2009) develop this approach and obtain a ranking of risky prospects (based on a "riskiness measure") when probabilities are uniquely de…ned. Here too we extend their approach to the case where probabilities are not uniquely de…ned, but are instead taken from a given set (see Section 3.3) . This ranking is shown to be strongly connected to the aforementioned ranking that is based on rejections that are uniform over utilities, a connection that is known to exist in the risk domain.
We build our setup by merging two existing strands of the literature, one that ranks gambles in the absence of a speci…c utility function, and another that ranks sets of gambles given a speci…c utility function.
The …rst strand of the literature models decisions under risk, i.e., assumes that a single probability distribution is given, while maintaining only very general assumptions about the utilities of decision makers (e.g., assuming only risk aversion or decreasing absolute risk aversion). Since a utility function is a subjective characteristic of the decision maker, while probabilities may be objective, these models o¤er riskiness measures that induce objective rankings of risky prospects using the known characteristics of the given probability distribution. For example, the Sharpe Value measure of riskiness is the expected value, not utility, of a random variable with a given probability distribution, divided by its standard deviation (in order to incorporate the risk aversion assumption). Riskiness measures and indices are widely used in …nance to compare investment alternatives regardless of the decision maker and his unique utility function, and lately have been explored also in economics. 3 Two economic riskiness measures were recently developed in a setup with known probabilities and a large class of utility functions: Aumann and Serrano's economic index of riskiness (2008) and Foster and Hart's operational measure of riskiness (2009). 4 These two measures are superior to previous measures and indices, including the Sharpe Value, in two aspects: (1) They do not violate stochastic dominance; 5 and (2) they are related to the concept of utility in a strong way: each of them can be induced by a corresponding uniform rejection criterion, as presented in Hart (2011) . Each of the uniform rejection criteria ranks a gamble g above a gamble h if a uniform rejection of g (uniform over wealth levels for one criterion and over utilities for the second) leads to a uniform rejection of h. 6 In this paper we develop similar uniform rejection criteria, which rank a set of gambles G above a set of gambles H if a uniform rejection of G leads to a uniform rejection of H. We show that the rankings of sets of gambles that are induced by these rejection criteria 3 See Drapeau and Kupper (2013) for a recent robustness treatment of a wide variety of riskiness measures. 4 Even more recently, Schreiber (2012) developed a similar economic index of relative riskiness. This index applies to shares (stocks), while the other two models of riskiness apply to gambles. 5 Artzner et al. (1999) suggest four axioms that characterize a "coherent" measure of risk. Monotonicity with respect to …rst-order stochastic dominance is analogous to one of these axioms, the "monotonicity" axiom. Out of the four axioms, only the "translation invariance" axiom is violated by each of these two new riskiness measures. See section VI(d) in Foster and Hart (2009) for a discussion of this violation. 6 A gamble g is wealth-uniformly rejected by u if g is rejected by u at all wealth levels w. Similarly, a gamble g is utility-uniformly rejected at wealth w if g is rejected by all utility functions u 2 U at w. See Section 2.1 for the de…nition of U and for further details on uniform rejection. are complete, and that they lead to natural generalizations of the Aumann-Serrano and Foster-Hart riskiness measures to the uncertainty domain. These generalized measures of riskiness preserve important features of the original ones -being the minimal reserve needed to guarantee no-bankruptcy in the case of the Foster-Hart measure (Section 3.3), and being grounded on a duality axiom in the case of the Aumann-Serrano index (Section 5.1.1).
The second strand of the literature mentioned above models decisions in situations where the utility of every …nal outcome is given, 7 but a unique probability distribution over the events leading to these outcomes is either non-existent or unknown. These are models of decision under uncertainty (to be distinguished from decisions under risk). In models of decision under uncertainty, the decision maker, henceforth DM, chooses between acts, where acts are de…ned as mappings from states of nature to objective lotteries or to deterministic outcomes. The simpli…ed assumption that each decision maker assigns a unique and subjective probability distribution to the states of nature, such that every act is reducible to one lottery (as in Savage 1954) became highly unsatisfactory after Ellsberg introduced his famous paradox (Ellsberg 1961) . One plausible solution to this paradox, suggested …rst by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) , is to replace the single probability distribution over the states of nature with multiple probability distributions. However, this complicates the comparison of di¤erent DMs, because even if they use the same set of priors, they may still use di¤erent priors in that set when judging the same act. In particular, in the MEU model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) , each DM would judge the act by the speci…c prior that minimizes his own expected utility over the set of priors. This implies that tools that enable one to objectively rank gambles, such as the aforementioned riskiness measures, may not su¢ ce to rank acts even when the set of priors is exogenously given (more on this in Section 3.2). Nevertheless, we show that such ranking is possible, in MEU and in other models as well. In terms of riskiness and its applicability to the domain of uncertainty, our results form an extension of the original riskiness measures of Aumann and Serrano (2008) and Foster and Hart (2009) from the domain of risk to the domain of uncer-tainty, while maintaining a natural interpretation in terms of those measures. In terms of modeling decision under uncertainty, we o¤er complete orders that do not originate from the preferences of a single individual, thus overcoming certain limitations of prevalent models, and in particular the partial orders they often produce and their reliance on given preferences (or utilities). 8 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we de…ne the basic concepts. In Section 3 we apply the two uniform rejection criteria of Hart (2011) to the MEU model in order to get an initial insight, and develop two corresponding rankings of acts. In this setup we treat the set of priors as exogenously given, so that every act is associated with a unique set of gambles. Each of the two uniform rejection criteria is applied to create a complete ranking of those sets of gambles. Moreover, it turns out that each of the two resulting rankings can be directly generated by calculating the maximal value over the riskiness measures of the gambles in the set. We then show that the equivalent to Foster and Hart's riskiness measure, for sets of gambles instead of single ones, maintains the characteristic of being the minimal reserve needed to guarantee no bankruptcy. As for DMs who use maximax instead of maximin, we brie ‡y show that similar rankings apply, with the minimal riskiness measures replacing the maximal ones.
In Section 4 we discuss some other related models of decision under uncertainty (Schmeidler 1989 , Bewley 2002 , Gajdos et al. 2008 , and show that a similar result applies to them too. We then discuss the implications of adopting a minimax regret attitude, and show that it calls for a generalization of the rankings developed thus far. Section 5 o¤ers such generalization, by using Olszewski (2007) as the underlying model of decision on which to apply the uniform-rejection criteria. In Olszewski (2007) , decision makers use a weighted average of the best and the worst lotteries in the set (in terms of expected utility). 9 We develop complete rankings of sets of 8 The partiality of the orders and the reliance on utilities are intertwined in some models. For example, Epstein (1999) and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) , who are interested in comparing DMs and not acts, can compare two decision makers only if they share the same utility function and one of them has SEU preferences. Models that are not restricted in this way (such as Gajdos et al. 2008 , who are also interested in comparing DMs), often avoid this restriction by ignoring risk attitudes altogether. When the goal is to rank prospects instead of DMs, this approach has its own problems, as is apparent when trying to compare risky prospects to ambiguous ones (e.g., prospect A that yields 4 or 10 with equal probabilities, and prospect B that yields 6 or 8 with unknown probabilities). 9 This approach is quite common in models that deal with ranking sets. For example, Kannai and Peleg (1984) show that some plausible properties imposed on a ranking criterion imply that gambles for any such mixture of optimism and pessimism. Quite surprisingly, the rankings that we get cannot be represented by a weighted average of the maximal and minimal riskiness measures of the gambles in the set. The …nal step is performed in Section 6, where we expand the de…nition of uniform rejection to include uniformity over , the extent of optimism, and apply the new extended uniform rejection criteria to generate the most generally motivated (from a theoretical point of view) rankings that are still complete. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Working with sets of gambles or sets of lotteries 10 as primitives is less common in the literature than working with acts, but it was already done by few. any set A must be indi¤erent to the set consisting of the best element and the worst element in A. For a survey of papers that illustrates the fundamental role of the best and worst elements in establishing a ranking of sets of alternatives, see Barbera et al. (2004) . On the other hand, Eichberger et al. (2011) have recently showed some limitations of this approach, by demonstrating that the axioms of Ghirardato et al. (2004) imply that preferences must be either maxmin or maxmax when the state space is …nite. 10 The slight di¤erence between a gamble and a lottery is explained in Section 2. 11 Note that the outcomes of gambles are net outcomes -gains and losses -in contrast to lotteries, where the outcomes are …nal outcomes.
Let G denote the collection of all such gambles. We will say that a set of gambles G G has …nite support if there exists a …nite set Z < s.t. suppfgg Z for all g in G. Let G denote the collection of all such sets of gambles.
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Let u be a vN-M utility function. We say that u rejects the gamble g at wealth
Let L be the set of all real-valued random variable with …nitely many values. The elements of L are called lotteries, and we have G L. Compound lotteries are lotteries themselves, i.e., L = L. In this paper we will interpret the outcomes of lotteries as …nal wealth levels, and the outcomes of gambles as net values (i.e., gains when positive and losses when negative).
Let S = fs 1 ; s 2 ; :::; s N g denote the set of N states of nature, and let P denote all applicable probability distributions over the set S. Acts are mappings from states of nature to lotteries, A : S ! L. Note that given a speci…c probability distribution p 2 P over the set of states of nature S, all ambiguity is resolved, and any act a 2 A can be translated to a corresponding compound lottery that gives lottery a(s i ) with probability p(s i ), 8s i 2 S. We denote this compound lottery by F (a; p) 2 L. Finally, for every set of probability distributions P P, we have F (a; P ) fF (a; p) : p 2 P g.
Riskiness
For every gamble g 2 G, we have:
R F H (g), the Foster-Hart measure of riskiness of g, is given implicitly by
Furthermore, Hart (2011) shows that each of these two riskiness measures can be induced by a uniform rejection criterion as follows.
Let g; h 2 G, and let U be the set of "regular utilities" in Hart (2011) . This set includes all strictly rising and strictly risk-averse utility functions that satisfy (a) the two "Arrow conditions" (Arrow 1965 , Lecture 2 and Arrow 1971, page 96) -decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) and increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA); and (b) no gamble should always (i.e., at any wealth level) be accepted by u 2 U . We say that g wealth-uniformly dominates h, which we write g W U h, if the following holds:
For every utility u 2 U , 13 if g is rejected by u at all w > 0 then h is rejected by u at all w > 0.
Theorem 1(i) in Hart (2011) states that for any two gambles g and h in G,
Similarly, we say that g utility-uniformly dominates h, which we write g U U h, if the following holds:
For every wealth level w > 0, if g is rejected by all u 2 U at w then h is rejected by all u 2 U at w.
Theorem 1(ii) in Hart (2011) states that for any two gambles g and h in G,
3 Development of a benchmark model
From acts to sets of gambles
In the framework of decision under uncertainty, the objects to be ranked are usually acts. The …rst axiomatization of decision under uncertainty is that of Savage (1954) , but the …rst setup to include lotteries and acts together is that of Anscombe 13 As pointed out in Hart (2011), Section IV (d,e), without some regularity assumptions on the acceptance/rejection decisions, the uniformity requirements become vacuous, and the use of one class of utilities U for both wealth-uniform and utility-uniform dominance is more elegant and tractable but is not mandatory: for most of the results presented here, U can be replaced by other less restrictive classes of utilities.
and Aumann (1963) . In both setups, it is possible to elicit a subjective probability for every state of nature, as long as the preference relation satis…es certain reasonable axioms. However, Ellsberg (1961) showed that the very assumption of having a unique subjective probability corresponding to every state of nature is questionable. The decision maker in Ellsberg (1961) violates the Savage axioms and demonstrates an aversion towards "uncertainty" that is distinguishable from the widespread aversion towards risk. In the aftermath of the Ellsberg Paradox, new models tried to incorporate this property of "uncertainty aversion." One such fundamental model is the MEU model, that solves the Ellsberg Paradox in the following way: the decision maker behaves as if he has a set of probability distributions over the states of nature, and when faced with a certain act in the context of a decision problem, he attaches to it the minimal utility over the probability distributions in his set.
14 As a result, the probability attached to a state of nature is no longer independent of the payo¤ corresponding to it, as is the case in Savage's framework (1954). More formally, let % be a complete preference relation over standard lotteries. then there exists an a¢ ne function u : A ! < and a non-empty, closed and convex set P P, such that:
Using the notations de…ned in Section 2 we can write:
Denote now by G and H the sets of lotteries corresponding to acts a; b respectively under the set of probability distributions P , i.e., G F (a; P ) and H F (b; P ). Then G; H L, and
The last correspondence states that every decision maker compares any two acts by comparing the minimal utility over the sets of lotteries corresponding to those acts. As already pointed out by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) , this result stands in line with the minimax loss criterion of Wald (1950) : "A minimax solution seems, in general, to be a reasonable solution of the decision problem when an a priori distribution in Q does not exist or is unknown to the experimenter".
While Gilboa and Schmeidler are agnostic about the way in which the set P of probability distributions is determined, we explicitly treat P as externally given. This treatment is in line with that of Gilboa et al. (2010) , who provide foundations for the cognitive interpretation of the set of priors P as those that are "objectively given"and used for the maximin rule. Technically, this means that all DMs judge any act a by the same objective set of lotteries F (a; P ). 15 The subjectivity associated with a speci…c utility function manifests itself in the choice of the worst lottery in a given set of lotteries and in the ranking of the worst lotteries of di¤erent sets. At this point, the maximin decision rule is de…ned for sets of lotteries, not gambles, the basic objects in Hart (2011) . Therefore, in order to apply the concept of riskiness to the sets G and H, we …rst require that all lotteries be de…ned in net values (as opposed to …nal outcomes). We also restrict the possible combinations of priors and acts to include only gambles, i.e., have positive expectation and a strictly positive probability to lose. 16 However, this is compensated by broadening the set of objects for comparison. In particular, in the MEU setup, P must be closed and 15 Note also that if the di¤erent utility functions represent the "multiple selves" of one decision maker, the assumption of a common set of priors is natural, and P does not have to be externally given, only well de…ned. In Section 4.3 we treat the case in which the "behavioral" set of priors, on which the worst-case is calculated, is a subset of the externally determined set P , and may di¤er between DMs. 16 One can remove this restriction by setting zero riskiness for every gamble with no probability to lose, and in…nite riskiness for every gamble with a negative expectation, but then it will not be possible to rank gambles belonging to any of these classes. Moreover, Propositions 3 and 4 rank sets of gambles according to the riskiest gamble in the set, so even if only one of the gambles in the set has a negative expectation, the riskiness of the set will go to in…nity. Similarly, Proposition 6 ranks sets of gambles according to the least risky gamble in the set, so even if only one of the gambles in the set has a zero probability to lose, the riskiness of the set will be set to zero. These limitations are less restrictive when considering the more general riskiness measures of Section 5. convex, so that each of the sets G and H is created by attaching a closed and convex set of priors (over the states of nature) to an act. But, by allowing G and H to be any sets in G (i.e., not necessarily connected to speci…c acts, and even if connected to acts, not necessarily sharing a common set of priors over the states of nature; see Section 2), we can get a stronger comparison tool. 17 The resultant decision rule would then be: 8u and 8G; H 2 G,
We turn now to apply the uniform rejection criteria of Hart (2011) to the class of DMs who follow (1).
Minimal utility vs. maximal riskiness
In order to extend the original riskiness measures of Aumann and Serrano (2008) and Foster and Hart (2009) to sets of gambles using the uniform rejection criteria of Hart (2011), we need to consider acceptance and rejection of such sets by various MEU -type DMs at di¤erent wealth levels. The decision rule given in (1) implies that u rejects the set of gambles G at wealth w if u(w) min g2G E [u (w + g)], and
Note that each decision maker evaluates the set of gambles according to his subjectively worst gamble in the set. Thus, two arbitrary decision makers may disagree on the identity of the worst gamble in each set, hence on the objects to be compared in order to rank those sets. The direct consequence of this complication is that the existence of a criterion that leads to a complete "objective"ranking of gambles (as demonstrated by Hart 2011) does not guarantee that this criterion, when applied to sets of gambles, would also lead to a complete objective ranking of those sets. Figure 1 illustrates this complication. We want to compare two sets of gambles -set G and set H, where each is created by attaching a set of priors of the form (p 1 ; p 2 ; p 3 ) to the gamble that pays N with probability p 1 , 0 with probability p 2 , and M with probability p 3 = 1 p 1 p 2 (where M and N are strictly positive). We use g 1 and g 2 to denote gambles belonging to the set G, and h 1 and h 2 to denote gambles belonging to the set H. In Figure 1 (a), both u 1 and u 2 strictly prefer g 1 to h 1 , and so may do an objective order that is based on one of the aforementioned uniform rejection rules. Likewise, both u 1 and u 2 strictly prefer h 2 to g 2 , and so may do the objective order. However, note that u 1 judges the sets G and H according to his subjective worst-case scenarios g 1 and h 1 respectively, thus preferring G to H, while u 2 does the same according to his subjective worst-case scenarios g 2 and h 2 , thus preferring H to G. Hence, the existence of an objective ordering of these two sets cannot be guaranteed, as it is unclear how to compare G to H, and even whether a clear ranking of the sets is possible at all. In Figure 1 (b) the situation is even more complicated -u 1 and u 2 disagree even about the internal rankings of g 1 vs. h 1 and of g 2 vs. h 2 . In addition, u 1 judges the sets G and H by g 1 and h 1 , resulting in a preference for set G, while u 2 does the same for g 2 and h 2 , resulting in a preference for set H.
Eventually, despite this problem, it is indeed possible to achieve two parallel complete rankings of sets of gambles based on the two uniform rejection criteria of Hart (2011) . Each of these two rankings turns out to be based on the gamble that maximizes the corresponding riskiness measure over the set of gambles. This is true even though individual decision makers compare the sets according to their subjective worst gamble, and not according to this focal point of maximal riskiness (this complication does not exist in the setup of Hart 2011, in which the riskiness is computed for the same gambles that are used by the DMs for making a choice). Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 state this result, following a few necessary de…nitions. De…nition 1 Let G; H 2 G. We say that G wealth-uniformly dominates H, which we write G W U H, if the following holds:
For every utility u 2 U , If G is rejected by u at all w > 0 Then H is rejected by u at all w > 0: De…nition 2 Let G; H 2 G. We say that G utility-uniformly dominates H, which we write G U U H, if the following holds:
For every wealth level w > 0, If G is rejected by all u 2 U at w Then H is rejected by all u 2 U at w: Figure 1 : Two Marschak-Machina probability triangles demonstrating the comparison problem. Every point inside a triangle corresponds to a unique gamble, with probability p 1 to get N , probability p 3 to get +M , and probability 1 p 1 p 3 to stay with the initial endowment. In each …gure, G is the set of gambles that are restricted from below by the red curve, and H is the set of gambles that are restricted from below by the light blue curve. g 1 and h 1 designate the gambles that minimize the expected utility of u 1 over the sets G and H respectively, and so do g 2 and h 2 with respect to u 2 . In both …gures
, and so u 1 prefers set G over set H while u 2 prefers set H over set G.
Proposition 3 For any two sets G and H in G, G W U H, if and only if max
h2H R AS (h) max g2G R AS (g).
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Proposition 4 For any two sets G and H in G, G U U H, if and only if max
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Notice that both
where kG is the set containing the same gambles as G with all outcomes multiplied by k. This follows from the homogeneity of degree 1 of max( ), R AS (g) and R F H (g). This property is generalized in Proposition 20 (see Section 5, where other properties are discussed too).
Concentrating on the riskiest gamble in the set may seem too extreme in …rst glance (and indeed would not characterize the generalized rankings of Section 5), in line with the prima facie extreme uncertainty aversion of the decision makers who follow the maximin rule. However, we turn to show now that this extremity preserves an important aspect of the riskiness measure R F H ( ). 
Foster-Hart riskiness as critical wealth
In Foster and Hart (2009), the authors interpret R F H (g) as the minimal reserve needed to guarantee no bankruptcy when taking the gamble g sequentially. In their setup, one faces a series of consecutive gambles that are realized one after the other. Similarly, in our setup one faces a series of sets of gambles, where the realization of every set in the series is a realization of one gamble that is drawn from that set. Therefore, if one's objective is to guarantee no bankruptcy, one should look at the riskiest possible scenario and avoid bankruptcy in this extreme scenario. This can be guaranteed only by judging a set G according to its riskiest component, i.e., by max
18 R AS ( ) is continuous hence gets its minimum and maximum values over compact sets. 19 R F H ( ) is not continuous hence does not necessarily get minimum and maximum values over compact sets. However, we prove in the appendix that if the set of gambles G is compact and has a …xed and …nite support, then R F H ( ) indeed gets its minimum and maximum values over G. This guarantees that R F H ( ) gets its minimum and maximum values over every G 2 G. 20 We discuss the properties of R AS (G) as a riskiness measure for sets of gambles in Section 5.1.1 (after introducing a generalization of this measure).
More formally, a process (G t ) t=1;2;::: is generated by a sequence of elements of G. When a set G 2 G is accepted by the DM, a gamble g 2 G is chosen (with no restriction on the choice process) and one of its outcomes is realized. A simple strategy s Q yields no-bankruptcy for the process (G t ) t=1;2;::: and the initial wealth w 1 if P [lim t!1 w t = 0] = 0, and guarantees no-bankruptcy if it yields no-bankruptcy for every process (G t ) t=1;2;::: and every initial wealth W 1 (see Foster and Hart (2009) for further details). 
that a simple strategy s Q with a critical-wealth function Q guarantees no-bankruptcy if and only if
This proposition highlights the parallels between R F H (g) and
the minimal reserve needed to guarantee no bankruptcy when considering sequence of single gambles, ranks these gambles in line with the utility-uniform rejection criterion. Similarly, R F H (G) = max g2G R F H (g), the minimal reserve needed to guarantee no bankruptcy when considering sequence of sets of gambles, ranks those sets in line with the utility-uniform rejection criterion (when applied to DMs who follow the maximin rule).
The dual case of extreme optimists
At this point it is natural to examine if the uniform rejection criteria, when applied to sets of gambles, lead to complete rankings also when decision makers use a maximax decision rule instead of the maximin. We can refer to such decision makers as "optimists". An optimist u rejects the set of gambles G at wealth w, if and only if u(w) max
The following proposition states that applying the same uniform rejection criteria to the maximax decision rule leads to two complete rankings of sets, this time based on the least risky gamble in each set.
Proposition 6 For any two sets G and H in G, we have:
G U U H, if and only if min
So just as in the case of maximin, each of these two new rankings is based on an extremum of the riskiness measure over the whole set, although individual decision makers compare the sets according to their subjective most/least preferred gamble, and not according to this focal point of extremum riskiness.
4 Some related models of decision under uncertainty
Choquet Expected Utility
Any application of the fundamental models of decision under uncertainty seems incomplete without considering the Choquet Expected Utility model (CEU ) of Schmeidler (1989). The objects for comparison in CEU are acts, just as in MEU. However, while in MEU an act corresponds to a set of additive probability measures over the states of nature in S, in CEU an act corresponds to a non-additive probability measure over P , the algebra of subsets on S. This non-additive probability measure is called "capacity", and is denoted by v ( ).
The main theorem in CEU states that if is a preference relation that satis…es few axioms, then there exist a unique non-additive probability measure (capacity) on P and an a¢ ne function u : L ! R, such that for any two acts a and b,
The integral R S u (a ( )) dv , which may be referred to as "the utility of act a", is the Choquet Integral. It is calculated as a weighted sum of the utilities of the (…nitely many) outcomes of the act a: 
: [ s k 1 ) for k 6 = 1 (the indices correspond to that of k , and 1 = v (s 1 )).
In the CEU model, uncertainty aversion is characterized by a convex capacity
is increasing in R, where E; R 2 P are disjoint. This property of the capacity function may thus be understood as an increasing marginal contribution of E, for every E 2 P . One result of this property is that for every E 2 P , v (E) is a lower bound on the "probability"allocated to E (think of k as the probability allocated to s k ).
It is well known (e.g., see Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989 ) that for uncertaintyaverse preference relations, CEU becomes a special case of MEU, where the core of v( ) is the set of priors on which the minimum utility is computed. Thus, if one wishes to get a characterization of riskiness of acts in the CEU model for uncertainty-averse DMs, the immediate result is that the riskiness measure (be it R AS or R F H ) of an act is the maximal corresponding riskiness measure of the gambles that result from attaching the priors in the core of v( ) to that act. In order to get an objective ranking, v( ) must be exogenously given. However, whereas in the MEU model one could quite naturally interpret the set of priors as an objective data, it seems less convincing to treat v ( ) as a form in which objective data is supplied. Indeed, in the CEU model, v ( ) is just a representation of the subjective preference of a particular DM.
Unanimous preference and inertia
One may treat MEU as a complete order that extends the partial order of Bewley (2002) . 21 The decision rule presented in Bewley (2002) is:
So, for act a to be preferred over act b, it has to be unanimously preferred, i.e., preferred at every prior in the set P . 22 Aware that DMs need to make decisions even in the absence of strict preference, Bewley presents an "inertia"criterion, that roughly states that if act a was initially chosen, and now another act b can be chosen instead, the DM will switch from a to b only if b a.
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As noted by Bewley himself, when inertia is involved, MEU is no longer an extension of the order implied by equation 2. That is, for given u and P , it may be the case that MEU preferences imply that b a, while equation 2 with inertia implies rejecting b in order to stick with a. However, when considering constant acts, i.e., acts with constant payo¤s, these orders are strongly connected. Whenever some act a is compared to a constant payo¤, equation 2 strictly implies acceptance of a only if the utility of a under the worse-case scenario is greater than the utility from this constant payo¤. 24 Otherwise, inertia implies rejection of the act whenever the constant payo¤ precedes the consideration of the act, as in the case of initial wealth. This acceptance-rejection rule clearly resembles that of MEU. When it comes to considering uniform rejections in order to obtain complete rankings, the decision whether to accept or to reject an act is taken given the current wealth level w, thus the "constant payo¤"always precedes any act considered. Therefore, if the decision rule is equation 2 plus inertia, we get that act a is accepted by u if u(w) < u(w + g); 8g 2 G F (a; P ), and rejected otherwise. Clearly this rejection rule is identical to the one implied by the maximin rule discussed in the previous section. Consequentially, the two complete rankings introduced in Section 3 remain unchanged. It is worth noting that the rankings are complete even though the preferences of decision makers over acts are only partial.
"Behavioral" vs. "cognitive" sets of priors
In an attempt to relax the extreme degree of uncertainty aversion of DMs who follow the maximin rule with respect to an objectively given set of priors, Gajdos et al. (2008) disentangle this set, that represents information, namely, the "cognitive" one, and the set that governs behavior, that is, the "behavioral" one. 25 The "behavioral"set, ' (P ) (1 )s(P ) + P , is a contraction of P , the "cognitive"one, around s(P ), the Steiner Point of P (the Steiner Point is a common way to de…ne the "mean value" of a set of priors, see Schneider 1993) . Since DMs in this model follow the maximin rule with respect to ' (P ), serves as a measure of ambiguity aversion (Gajdos et al. call it "imprecision aversion"). This interpretation is even clearer, when considering an equivalent representation of the utility from act a given information P : u(a; P ) = min
To simplify notations, we resort here to talking about acts instead of sets of gambles, although all results can be directly generalized to any sets of gambles in G. Clearly, letting be any value in [0; 1] generalizes the special case of the MEU decision maker, for whom = 1. But, as opposed to the generalization o¤ered later in Section 5, this generalization is trivial when is exogenously given, because the " riskiness measure" of a set F (a; P ) is simply the maximal riskiness measure computed over the gambles in the set F (a; ' (P )) instead of F (a; P ). However, when applying uniformity over DMs in order to develop riskiness measures and rankings of acts, it seems natural to assume that DMs di¤er not only in their utility functions but also in their ambiguity aversion coe¢ cient . Thus, on the face of it, it is unclear which set of priors is relevant for ranking di¤erent acts.
To apply uniformity over DMs who are heterogeneous in as well as in u, we look at the set of DMs f(u; )g with u 2 U and 2 [ ; ], where 0 1. This means that the behavioral sets of priors of the DMs are proper subsets of each other, with ' (P ) being the minimal set of priors and ' (P ) being the maximal one. Proposition 9 below states that the uniform rejection criteria imply rankings of acts according to the riskiest gambles that correspond to these acts under the minimal set of priors, ' (P ).
De…nition 7 Let F (a; P ) ; F (b; P ) 2 G. We say that act a wealth-uniformly dominates act b under P and [ ; ], if the following holds:
For every utility u 2 U , If F (a; P ) is rejected by (u; ) for every 2 [ ; ] and at all w > 0, Then F (b; P ) is rejected by (u; ) for every 2 [ ; ] and at all w > 0.
De…nition 8 Let F (a; P ) ; F (b; P ) 2 G. We say that act a utility-uniformly dominates act b under P and [ ; ], if the following holds:
For every w > 0, If F (a; P ) is rejected at w by every (u; ) with u 2 U and 2 [ ; ], Then F (b; P ) is rejected at w by every (u; ) with u 2 U and 2 [ ; ].
Proposition 9
For any two acts a and b with corresponding sets of gambles F (a; P ) and F (b; P ) in G, F (a; p) ). F (a; p) ).
Act
a wealth-uniformly dominates act b under P and [ ; ] if and only if max p2'(P ) R AS (F (b; p)) max p2' (P ) R AS (
The most general case to consider here is naturally [ ; ] = [0; 1], where (given P ) every act would be ranked according to the riskiness of the unique gamble that corresponds to s(P ). This suggests an alternative "behavioral" de…nition of the riskiness measures for acts, where the Aumann-Serrano riskiness index of act a given the external set of priors P would be R AS (F (a; s(P ))) instead of max p2P R AS (F (a; p)) (and similarly for the Foster-Hart riskiness measure).
Minimax Regret
Another popular way to model decision under uncertainty is to use the minimax regret rule. There are various ways to model minimax regret (cf. Stoye 2011a , 2011b , and Berger 1985 . In the context of sets of gambles, one very natural way is the following. Let < u;w denote the complete and transitive preference relation of u at wealth w. Then G < u;w H if and only if
That is, u prefers set G to set H at w, if and only if the maximal disadvantage (in utility terms) of a gamble in G with respect to a gamble in H, indicating the maximal regret u may feel by preferring G to H, is smaller than the maximal disadvantage of a gamble in H with respect to a gamble in G. From this de…nition follows the condition for rejection: u rejects G at w if and only if:
Hence, for every pair (u; w), we can attach a binary tag to G -"accepted" or "rejected", based on the comparison of the maximal possible regret u can feel due to accepting G at w, and the maximal possible regret u can feel due to rejecting G at w. 26 We can then compare sets G and H by looking for pairs (u; w) where one set is rejected while the other is accepted. If whenever G is rejected by u at all w > 0 we get that H is rejected by u at all w > 0 too, and this holds for every u 2 U , then G wealth-uniformly dominates H. Similarly, if whenever G is rejected by every u 2 U at w, we get that H is rejected by every u 2 U at w too, and this holds for every w > 0, then G utility-uniformly dominates H.
Just as with maximin and maximax decision rules, there is no preliminary reason to believe that either one of these two methods would lead to a complete ranking, but once again they both do.
Rearranging (4), we get that u rejects G at w i¤:
This means that a DM with utility u judges G according to the average between his subjective worst case and best case scenarios. This is a special case of the well known -Hurwicz criterion with = 0:5. 27 Note that the averaging is done on the individual level, and, a bit surprisingly, applying the uniform rejection criteria does not lead to rankings that are based on averaging the riskiest and the least risky gambles in the set. We present the riskiness measures and rankings that 26 If one considered comparison of acts under a common set of priors instead of comparison of sets of gambles, then the choice between two acts a and b would not be as in (3), but rather: a < u;w b if and only if
However, when it comes to the rule for rejecting a single act a at w, it would not make any di¤erence, as we would get the following rejection rule:
which is the same as (4) for G = F (a; P ). 27 In the literature this criterion is often denoted by -Hurwicz, but we reserve the symbol to denote the Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient of CARA utilities. -Hurwicz is usually used in the context of acts, where the average is between the prior leading to the best outcome and the prior leading to the worst outcome. This is of course equivalent to translating the act and its corresponding set of priors to a set of gambles, and averaging between the gambles yielding the maximal utility and minimal utility respectively. result from decision rules that use weighted average of subjective worst case and best case scenarios in the next section, while using the setup of Olszewski (2007) as the underlying model of individual decision. We show that for every value of -Hurwicz there is a complete ranking based on wealth-uniform rejection, and a complete ranking based on utility-uniform rejection. The maximin, maximax, and minimax regret rules are all special cases of the decision rules discussed there.
-maximizers
Let G be a set of gambles in G. We consider now a DM who judges the set of gambles G by a weighted mean of his expected utility from the best and from the worst elements in the set. Formally, let
28 Then u who is a " -maximizer"(represented by the functional V ) rejects G at w if and only if V (w + G) u(w). Olszewski (2007) axiomatizes a similar preference relation over a family of closed sets of lotteries 29 for 2 (0; 1).
We are interested in …nding R AS (G) and R F H (G), which are (respectively) the Aumann-Serrano riskiness index of G for -maximizers and the Foster-Hart riskiness measure of G for -maximizers. Thus, each of the rankings of the sets G and H for -maximizers will be uniquely determined by R AS (G) or by R F H (G).
It turns out that each of these rankings is intimately related to a speci…c utility function, although the method used implies uniformity over all the utility functions in U , just as in previous sections. We refer to as the uncertainty-aversion parameter of the decision makers on which uniformity is applied. Notice that high is correlated with low uncertainty aversion.
= 0 and = 1 are the special cases of the maximin and maximax decision rules respectively, which are shown in Propositions 3, 4 and 6 to produce riskiness measures for sets that correspond to the maximum or the minimum riskiness measure for gambles taken over these sets. Uniformity over the values of will be presented in Section 6. 28 The dependency of V (w + G) on u( ) guarantees that V (w + G) is unique up to a¢ ne transformations, i.e., V (w + G) > V (w + H) () mV (w + G) + n > mV (w + H) + n. Moreover, the -representation is unique, since the set of gambles is given. 29 Of which G is a subset. For every u 2 U , If G is rejected by V u; at all w > 0, Then H is rejected by V u; at all w > 0.
Aumann-Serrano riskiness index of sets for -maximizers
De…nition 11 For every set of gambles G 2 G, let R AS (G) be the reciprocal of the value of such that a CARA person with risk-aversion coe¢ cient and uncertainty-aversion parameter is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the set G.
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Theorem 12 For any two sets of gambles G and H in G, G W U H if and only if R AS (G) R AS (H).
The duality axiom and the Aumann-Serrano riskiness index
Following Aumann and Serrano (2008), call V u 1 ; at least as risk-averse as V u 2 ; (written V u 1 ; D V u 2 ; ), if 8w 1 ; w 2 > 0, whenever V u 2 ; rejects a set of gambles This result should not come as a surprise given that the wealth-uniform domination is presented by Hart (2010) as a way to simplify the duality axiom of Aumann and Serrano (2008) . It does however mean that the same axiomatic foundation of Aumann and Serrano (2008) can be used to justify R AS (G).
Foster-Hart riskiness measure of sets for -maximizers
In Section VI(B) of Foster and Hart (2009) , the authors show that R F H (g) is the (unique) wealth level w such that the logarithmic utility decision maker is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the gamble g at w. Theorem 3 in Hart (2011) further states that for any two gambles g and h, g U U h if and only if R F H (g) R F H (h). Theorem 19, following the next de…nitions, extends this connection between the wealth level of indi¤erence for the log utility on the one hand, and the utility-uniform domination on the other hand, from single gambles to sets of gambles. De…nition 17 Let G; H 2 G and let 2 [0; 1]. We say that the set of gambles G -utility-uniformly dominates the set of gambles H, denoted G U U H, if the following holds:
For every wealth level w > 0, If for every u 2 U G is rejected by V u; at w, Then for every u 2 U H is rejected by V u; at w.
De…nition 18
For every set of gambles G 2 G, let R F H (G) be the wealth level 31 w such that a logarithmic utility decision maker with uncertainty-aversion parameter is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the set G at w.
Theorem 19
For any two set of gambles G and H in G, G U U H if and only if R F H (G) R F H (H).
Properties of the riskiness measures for sets of gambles
Some major properties that are shared by the two original measures in the risk domain hold for their extensions to the uncertainty domain too, at least for the corner cases of 2 f0; 1g. We start by introducing notations:
1. kG denotes the set of gambles that contains the same gambles as G, but such that all payo¤s of each gamble g 2 G are multiplied by the positive constant k (to form a new gamble denoted kg).
2. k G denotes the k-dilution of the set of gambles G, where with probability k some gamble g 2 G is performed, and with probability 1 k there is no gamble.
Proposition 20
For every 2 [0; 1], the following properties hold:
Proposition 21 If 2 f0; 1g, the following properties hold:
2. Convexity:
The fact that subadditivity and convexity hold for
, together with the relation of these speci…c measures to fundamental models of decision under uncertainty, as discussed in Sections 3 and 4, make them more convincing as measures of riskiness for sets. 32 In the case of FosterHart riskiness, max g2G R F H (g) is unique also in maintaining the property of being the minimal reserve needed to guarantee no bankruptcy, as showed in Section 3.3.
Uniformity over Uncertainty Aversion
The essence of using a uniform rejection criterion is to create a ranking that is independent of the speci…c preferences of di¤erent DMs. In this light, having a ranking that by de…nition depends on a speci…c uncertainty-aversion parameter , as presented in Section 5, may seem inadequate. 33 A solution to this inadequacy would be either to assume that all DMs follow a set of axioms that is translated to a unique uncertainty-aversion parameter , such as was done in the benchmark model using MEU to induce a "pessimist" behavior (i.e., = 0); or to create a ranking that is uniform over too. 34 To perform the latter, we introduce here an extended uniformity concept, that applies the uniform rejection method to the level of uncertainty-aversion too.
De…nition 22
Let G; H 2 G. We say that G wealth-uniformly and -uniformly dominates H, denoted G W U U H, if the following holds:
For every utility u 2 U , If G is rejected by V u; for every 2 [0; 1] and at all w > 0, Then H is rejected by V u; for every 2 [0; 1] and at all w > 0. 32 It is unclear whether subadditivity and convexity hold for other value of too. The problem is that for any of the riskiness measures, R (G + H) is based on a mixture between the best and worst gambles in G+H (as judged by the log utility or by CARA), which are not necessarily sums of the best and worse gambles in each set separately (on which R (G) and R (H) are based). This observation is true also for the case of f0; 1g, but then the characteristic of being the maximal or the minimal riskiness in the set is su¢ cient to ensure subadditivity and convexity. 33 The ranking developed here would turn out to be dependent of a speci…c uncertainty-aversion parameter too, but this would be a result rather than a predetermined restriction. 34 Yet another option is to apply uniformity over a range ; [0; 1], as is done in Section 4.3 for a range of ambiguity aversion coe¢ cients [ ; ]. It can be shown that this would result in complete rankings according to R AS (G) and R F H (G). That is, the rankings would be driven by the least uncertainty averse DMs in the range, just as the rankings in Section 4.3 were driven by the least ambiguity averse DMs in the range considered there. 
The proof for both propositions is immediate: if the set G is rejected at any degree of uncertainty aversion, then even the most optimistic DMs (those with parameter = 1) reject G. Likewise, if some DM with u 2 U and = 1 rejects G at w, then G would also be rejected at w by any V u; with 2 [0; 1). Hence, for every u and w, we have rejection by every 2 [0; 1] if and only if we have rejection by = 1. That is, the rankings are determined solely by the "optimists". Finally, Proposition 6 tells us that when ranking sets of gambles according to the preferences of "optimists", the minimal riskiness of the gambles in the set is the key for ranking.
Conclusion
Since a utility function is a subjective characteristic of the decision maker, while probabilities may be objective, riskiness measures o¤er objective rankings of risky prospects using the known characteristics of the given probability distribution. Riskiness measures are widely used in …nance to compare investment alternatives, and recently have been explored in economics too.
Two new riskiness measures were recently developed in the domain of risk: Aumann and Serrano's economic index of riskiness (2008), and Foster and Hart's operational measure of riskiness (2009). Hart (2011) shows that these two measures can be invoked by two corresponding uniform rejection criteria: wealth-uniform rejection and utility-uniform rejection. This suggests that these uniform rejection criteria are tools that can be used to develop complete and objective rankings of prospects in other domains too. In this paper we follow this route and develop complete rankings of sets of gambles, that arise naturally in many models of decision under uncertainty. The rankings developed suggest ways to de…ne riskiness measures for sets of gambles (and for acts, when a set of priors is given).
We present various rankings, all of which are complete. Each ranking implies an alternative way to de…ne the riskiness of sets of gambles, among them using the maximal riskiness of the gambles in the set, the minimal riskiness, and the riskiness of the gamble that results from using the Steiner point of the externally given set of priors as the probability distribution over the states of nature.
On the up side, it is good to have various ways to rank sets of gambles according to their riskiness or "attractiveness". It enables one to choose which ranking to use according to one's preferred premises. On the down side, the fact that the heterogeneity of approaches to model decision under uncertainty is translated into a plethora of optional riskiness measures, makes each one of them less convincing in itself. One solution that is discussed brie ‡y in Section 5.3 is to prefer riskiness measures that maintain as many desirable properties as possible. Further research is needed in order to reduce the number of measures on the basis of other normative or descriptive considerations that were not discussed here.
Appendix
In our proofs we will use K g to denote the maximal gain in the gamble g, and will use L g to denote the maximal loss in this gamble.
For each of the two riskiness measures, the Aumann-Serrano riskiness index and the Foster-Hart riskiness measure, we will …rst provide the proofs for -maximizers. Then the proofs for the maximin and maximax decision rules will follow as special cases. We assume throughout that G; H 2 G.
Aumann-Serrano riskiness index of sets for -maximizers
Fix 2 [0; 1] and let V V u; . We will focus for a while only on utilities that are characterized by constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). The set containing all these utilities will be denoted by U CA .
Every u 2 U CA can be fully characterized by its risk aversion coe¢ cient > 0, and will be denoted by u . For u = u with uncertainty-aversion coe¢ cient we use V .
Lemma 26 8g 1 ; g 2 2 G; u either prefers g 1 to g 2 at all w > 0, or prefers g 2 to g 1 at all w > 0.
Proof. u prefers g 1 to g 2 at w if and only if E e
, and this inequality is independent of w.
Following Lemma 26, we will perform the whole analysis of U CA behavior for some arbitrary w, and denote
Lemma 27 8 , V either accepts G at all w > 0, or rejects G at all w > 0.
Proof. V accepts G at w if and only if E e (w+M (G)) +(1 )E e (w+m (G)) > e w . Multiplying by e w yields a condition that is independent of w.
(strictly) rejects G at w. Then 9 s.t. 1 < < 2 and:
(ii) 8 < , V accepts G at w, and 8 > , V rejects G at w. We remind here that w in Lemma 28 is arbitrary and kept only for the coherence of the formulation. In fact the Lemma says that every V with < accepts G at all w > 0, and that every V with > rejects G at all w > 0.
u (w). u ( ) is continuous in because the functions E[ ]; max() and min() are all continuous, and because u is continuous 8 . Moreover u ( 1 ) > 0 and u ( 2 ) < 0. The continuity of u ( ) guarantees that 9 s.t. 1 < < 2 for which u ( ) = 0, i.e., V (w + G) = u (w).
(
Since G is compact, we thus have max
Finally, noticing that u (w) = 0 for all 35 See Proof of Theorem A in Aumann and Serrano (2008) .
. So u ( ) = 0 implies that 8 < we have u ( ) > 0, i.e., V accepts G at w, and 8 > we have u ( ) < 0, i.e., V rejects G at w.
Corollary 29
There is a unique 36 u 2 U CA s.t. u is indi¤erent to G (at all w).
This u is characterized by the unique > 0 that solves the equation
We now return to discuss the set of utilities U . We denote by u (w) the local (absolute) risk aversion coe¢ cient of u 2 U at w. Let g u;w max be a maximizer of the expected utility of u at wealth level w over the set of gambles G, i.e., g
Lemma 30 compares the acceptance and rejection criteria of a general u to those of u , and sets the ground for the main theorem. For every set G we denote by g the compound gamble M (G) + (1 ) m (G) (i.e., gamble M (G) with probability and gamble m (G) with probability 1 ), where is the unique risk aversion coe¢ cient of the CARA utility that satis…es V (w + G) = u(w) (as was shown in Lemma 28(i)).
Proof. (i) Assume that u (w) 8w > 0 for some u. Then obviously every gamble g that is rejected by u is rejected by u either. Assume now by negation that 9w s.t. u accepts G at w. Then u in fact accepts g u;w max +(1 ) g u;w min at w, and therefore accepts g u;w max +(1 ) m (G) at w too. 37 On the other hand, we know that u is indi¤erent to G at w, thus (weakly) rejects g u;w max + (1 ) m (G) at w (remember that if u is indi¤erent to G at some w 0 , u is also indi¤erent to G at any other w). So the compound gamble g u;w max + (1 ) m (G) is accepted at w by u but rejected by u , in contradiction to the assumption.
(ii) We repeat almost the same proof: now we denote b is accepted atŵ by u but rejected atŵ by u b , in contradiction to the assumption.
We are now ready for the main proposition on Aumann-Serrano riskiness of sets. Proposition 31 identi…es every set of gambles G with a unique compound gamble g on the grounds of wealth-uniform rejection. As a result, the complete ranking of gambles induces a complete ranking of sets of gambles.
Proposition 31 For every u 2 U , u rejects g 8w > 0 if and only if u rejects G 8w > 0.
Indeed if u rejects g at some w 0 , then from Proposition 4(iii) in Hart (2011) we
. Since u rejects g 8w > 0, we get that u (w) 8w > 0, and from Lemma 30(i) we conclude that u rejects G 8w > 0.
Direction (2): u rejects G 8w > 0 ) u rejects g 8w > 0. Assume by negation that u accepts g at some w 0 . Then from Proposition 4(ii)
in Hart (2011) we get that u (w 0 + K g ) < . From the decreasing absolute risk aversion of u we then get that 8w > w 0 + K g , u (w) < . In particular let
Lemma 30(ii) we know that u accepts G at w 00 , in contradiction to the assumption.
As de…ned in the paper, R AS (G) is the reciprocal of the (unique) such that a CARA person with risk-aversion parameter and uncertainty-aversion parameter is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the set G. Since we know that this CARA person has parameter (G), and since R AS g (G) is the reciprocal of (G) (from Theorem B in Aumann and Serrano 2009, while recalling that a CARA person with parameter (G) is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting g (G) ), we get that R AS (G) = R AS g (G) .
We are now ready to prove the main theorem for the Aumann-Serrano riskiness index and the properties of this index.
Proof of Theorem 12. From Proposition 31 we know that G W U H if and only if g (G) W U h (H) . Then from Hart (2011) we get
Proof of Proposition 20 -for the Aumann-Serrano riskiness index.
Let (G)
. Since Ee
Ee k kg 8kg 2 kG, which means that a CARA utility with risk-aversion coe¢ cient k k prefers the gamble kM (G) 2 kG to any other gamble in kG, i.e., M k (kG) = kM (G). Similarly, m k (kG) = km (G). Writing down the expected utility that a CARA person with risk-aversion coe¢ cient k gets from accepting the set kG (at w = 0, for simplicity), and using the indi¤erence of a CARA person with risk-aversion coe¢ cient towards G, we get that
i.e., the CARA utility with risk-aversion coe¢ cient k = k is indi¤erent towards the set of gambles kG, thus R AS (kG) =
2. Let denote the risk-aversion coe¢ cient of a CARA utility that is indifferent to k G, the k dilution of G. Expressing this indi¤erence at some arbitrary w we get that
By the uniqueness of (G) (Corollary 29) we thus get that = (G). That is, indi¤erence to k G implies the same constant risk-aversion coe¢ cient as indi¤erence to G, and so R AS (k G) = R AS (G). (G) (the …rst inequality by Lemma 18 in Hart 2010, and the second by Lemma 30 (ii)), and so inf u 1 (H). Thus H is rejected by V u 1 ; at w by Lemma 30 (i).
As for the opposite direction, assume that G W U H, and so (G) < (H). Take and such that < (G) < < (H), and set u 1 u and u 2 u . Then V u 1 ; D V u 2 ; (by Lemma 18 in Hart 2010), G is rejected by V u 2 ; at all w (by Lemma 28 (ii)), while H is accepted by V u 1 ; at every w (by the same lemma), and so G D H.
Aumann-Serrano riskiness index of sets for maximin and maximax decision rules
We are now ready to prove Propositions 3 and 6 (1) as special cases of Theorem 12. Speci…cally, when DMs judge every set G by their (subjective) worse gamble in the set (in terms of expected utility), = 0, and we will prove that R AS 0 (G) = max g2G R AS (g). Similarly, when DMs judge every set G by their (subjective) best gamble in the set, = 1, and we will prove that R
Proof of Proposition 3. Let g 2 arg max g2G R AS (g) and
. Then by Theorem B in Aumann and Serrano (2009), u is indi¤erent to g (at all w > 0). Therefore, every CARA utility u with > rejects g at all w > 0 hence rejects G at all w > 0 (judging G by the worst case). Similarly, every u with < accepts g at all w > 0 hence accepts G at all w > 0 (otherwise u rejects m (G) while accepting g, in contradiction to R AS (m (G)) R AS ( g)). Then from Lemma 28, u is indi¤erent to G (at all w > 0). Denote by R AS 0 (G) the reciprocal of the (unique) such that a CARA person with risk-aversion parameter and uncertainty-aversion parameter = 0 is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the set G. Then . Then by Theorem B in Aumann and Serrano (2009), u is indi¤erent to g (at all w > 0). Therefore, every CARA utility u with < accepts g at all w > 0 hence accepts G at all w > 0 (judging G by the best case). Similarly, every u with > rejects g at all w > 0 hence rejects G at all w > 0 (because rejection of g implies rejection of every g 2 G, hence of G itself). Then from Lemma 28, u is indi¤erent to G (at all w > 0). Denote by R AS 1 (G) the reciprocal of the (unique) such that a CARA person with risk-aversion parameter and uncertainty-aversion parameter = 1 is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the set G. Then R
Theorem 12 we get G W U H, if and only if min
Aumann-Serrano riskiness index for maximin over behavioral sets Proof of Proposition 9 -for the Aumann-Serrano riskiness index. First note that if F (a; P ) is rejected by (u; ) for every 2 [ ; ] and at all w > 0, then in particular (u; ) rejects F (a; P ) at all w > 0. Likewise, for every wealth level w, if (u; ) rejects F (a; P ) at w, then F (a; P ) is rejected at w by (u; ) for every 2 [ ; ], because u(a; P ) weakly decreases with . Hence we see that F (a; P ) is rejected by 
Foster-Hart riskiness measure of sets for -maximizers
Fix 2 [0; 1] and let V V u; . For the log utility (i.e., u lg (w) log(w)) we will denote a maximizer and a minimizer of the expected utility at wealth level w by M w (G) 2 arg max Lemma 32 There is a unique w 0 s.t. V lg (w 0 + G) = log(w 0 ) (i.e., u lg (w) is indifferent towards G at w 0 ). Moreover, u lg (w) accepts G for every w > w 0 and rejects G for every w < w 0 . respectively. Then 8w < r(G); u lg (w) rejects every g 2 G hence rejects G (i.e., u < 0), and 8w > R(G); u lg (w) accepts every g 2 G hence accepts 38 G (i.e., u > 0). From the continuity of u we conclude that 9w 0 > 0 s.t. u = 0 at w 0 ,
i.e., V lg (w 0 + G) = u lg (w 0 ).
Assume now by negation that 9w 00 < w 0 s.t. u lg (w) (weakly) accepts G at w 00 .
except for replacing the most preferred gamble at w 0 with potentially a di¤erent one). By assumption, u lg (w) (weakly) accepts G at w 00 , i.e., (weakly) accepts M w 00 (G) + (1 ) m w 00 (G) at w 00 , hence (weakly) accepts g 1 at w 00 (this time replacing the least preferred gamble with potentially a di¤erent one). So we get that u lg (w) (weakly) accepts g 1 at w 00 < w 0 while (weakly) rejecting g 1 at w 0 , in contradiction with the strictly decreasing absolute risk aversion property of the log utility. Similarly, assume now by negation that 9w 00 > w 0 s.t. u lg (w) (weakly) rejects G at w 00 . u lg (w) is indi¤erent towardsĝ at w 0 , hence (weakly) accepts g 2 M w 0 (G) + (1 ) m w 00 (G) at w 0 . By assumption, u lg (w) (weakly) rejects G at w 00 ,
i.e., (weakly) rejects M w 00 (G)+(1 ) m w 00 (G) at w 00 , hence (weakly) rejects g 2 at w 00 . So we get that u lg (w) (weakly) rejects g 2 at w 00 > w 0 while (weakly) accepting g 2 at w 0 , in contradiction with the strictly decreasing absolute risk aversion property of the log utility. Denote l(G) M w 0 (G) + (1 ) m w 0 (G) (where w 0 is the unique w s.t.
u lg (w) is indi¤erent towards G at w). Then we have:
Corollary 33 u lg (w) accepts G at some w if and only if u lg (w) accepts l (G) at that w.
Proof. The strictly decreasing absolute risk aversion property of the log utility implies that 9w such that u lg (w) is indi¤erent towards l (G) at w , accepts l (G) 8w > w , and rejects l (G) 8w < w . 39 Since u lg (w) is indi¤erent towards G and 38 u lg (w) is a special case: for every gamble g, u lg (w) accepts g whenever w > R F H (g), and rejects g whenever w < R F H (g). At w = R F H (g) u lg (w) is indi¤erent to g (see Foster and Hart 2009 , section VI(B)). 39 Foster and Hart (2009) show that w = R F H (l(G)).
therefore towards l (G) at w 0 , we get that w = w 0 , hence u lg (w) accepts both G and l (G) 8w > w 0 , and rejects both G and l (G) 8w < w .
We are now ready for the main proposition on Foster-Hart riskiness of sets, encompassing the more general set of utilities U . Proposition 34 identi…es every set of gambles G with the unique compound gamble l(G) on the grounds of utilityuniform rejection. As a result, the complete ranking of gambles induces a complete ranking of sets of gambles.
Proposition 34 8w > 0, every u 2 U rejects l(G) at w if and only if every u 2 U rejects G at w.
Let w > 0 be an arbitrary wealth level. Every u 2 U rejects G at w, so u lg (w) 2 U rejects G at w either, and by corollary 33 u lg (w) rejects l(G) at w. As de…ned in the paper, we denote by R F H (G) the (unique) wealth level w at which a logarithmic utility decision maker with uncertainty-aversion parameter is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the set G. But this wealth level is exactly w 0 , and since the indi¤erence of u lg (w) toward G at w 0 implies the indi¤er-ence of u lg (w) toward l (G) at w 0 , w 0 equals R F H (l(G)), and we get that
We are now ready to prove the main theorem for the Foster-Hart riskiness measure and the properties of this measure. 
Proof of Proposition 20 -for the Foster-Hart riskiness measure.
1. Since M w (G) maximizes the expected log utility at w over the set of gambles G, we have E [log (w + M w (G))] E [log (w + g)] 8g 2 G. Adding log (k) to both sides of the inequality, we get that E [log (kw + kM w (G))] E [log (kw + kg)] 8g 2 G, i.e., kM w (G) 2 kG maximizes the expected log utility at kw over the set kG. Similarly, km w (G) minimizes the expected log utility at kw over kG. Using the fact that w 0 is the (unique) solution to the equation log(w) = E[log (w + M w (G))] + (1 ) E [log (w + m w (G))], we get that the expected log utility of accepting the set kG at kw 0 is given by i.e., the log utility is indi¤erent towards kG at kw 0 . By the de…nition of R F H , we thus get that R F H (kG) = kw 0 = kR F H (G).
2. Let w 00 denote the wealth level at which the log utility is indi¤erent to k G.
We then have log(w 00 ) = k [ E[log (w 00 + M w 00 (G))] + (1 ) E [log (w 00 + m w 00 (G))]] + (1 k) (log(w 00 ))
) k log(w 00 ) = k [ E[log (w 00 + M w 00 (G))] + (1 ) E [log (w 00 + m w 00 (G))]] .
Dividing both sides of the equation by k we get that the log utility is indi¤erent to G at w 00 , and by the uniqueness of w 0 (Lemma 32) we get that w 00 = w 0 , hence R F H (k G) = R F H (G).
Foster-Hart riskiness measure of sets for maximin and maximax decision rules
We are now ready to prove Propositions 4 and 6 (2) as special cases of Theorem 19. Speci…cally, when DMs judge every set G by their (subjective) worse gamble in the set (in terms of expected utility), = 0, and we will prove that R F H 0 (G) = max g2G R F H (g). similarly, when DMs judge every set G by their (subjective) best gamble in the set, = 1, and we will prove that R (G) equals the wealth level w 00 at which a log utility u lg (w) with uncertainty-aversion parameter = 1 is indi¤erent to G. Let g 2 arg min g2G R F H (g). 8w < R F H (g) we have w < R F H (g) 8g 2 G, hence u lg (w) rejects every gamble in G at w, i.e., u lg (w) rejects G at w. Conversely, 8w > R F H ( g) we know that u lg (w) accepts g at w, and therefore also accepts G (judged by the best case) at w. From the continuity of u lg (w) we then get that R Foster-Hart riskiness measure for maximin over behavioral sets Proof of Proposition 9 -for the Foster-Hart riskiness measure. First note that if F (a; P ) is rejected at w by every (u; ) with u 2 U and 2 [ ; ], then in particular it is rejected by every (u; ) with u 2 U . Likewise, 8u 2 U , if (u; ) rejects F (a; P ) at some w, then F (a; P ) is rejected at w by (u; ) for every 2 [ ; ], because u(a; P ) weakly decreases with . Hence we see that F (a; P ) is rejected at w by every (u; ) with u 2 U and 2 [ ; ] if and only if F (a; P ) is rejected at w by every (u; ) with u 2 U , i.e., if and only if G F a; ' (P ) is rejected at w by every u 2 U with MEU preferences. So, saying that a utility-uniformly dominates b under P and [ ; ] is equivalent to saying that G F a; ' (P ) utilityuniformly dominates H F b; ' (P ) , and from Proposition 4 we know this holds if and only if max R F H (F (a; p)).
Extrema of R F H (g) in sets of gambles
We now prove that if the set of gambles G is compact, and has a …xed and …nite support, then R F H ( ) gets its minimum and maximum values over every G 2 G, although R F H ( ) is not a continuous function.
Lemma 35
If G G is compact and has …nite support, then both sup R F H (g) and inf R F H (g) are attained in G. . Therefore all inequalities are equalities, and so = R F H (g 0 ).
Proof. (i) Let inf
(ii) Let sup +R(h) = R 1 (G) + R 1 (H). Thus R 1 (G + H) R 1 (G) + R 1 (H).
2. Convexity follows directly from subadditivity and homogeneity.
